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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the theoretical finance-growth nexus. Using the Neoclassical growth 
framework, we raise a new issue where our finance-growth nexus has multiple stationary 
states with threshold effect. Threshold effect prevents the economy to reach long-run 
steady state equilibrium of capital and hence financial economists in developing countries 
should be aware of such an impediment. We show that the development of banking sector 
should be more supported than financial market, since banking sector is better than 
financial market in order to reduce threshold effect and ensure the existence and 
uniqueness of a higher long-run steady state equilibrium of capital stock.  
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1. Introduction 
 During the last two decades, the literatures on the nexus between financial 
development and economic growth emerge, but the findings are still subject to relevant 
debate until nowadays2. In developing countries study, particularly, financial 
development is associated with banking sector development, since financial market is 
underdeveloped. However, the more recent literature suggests that financial market 
should be also taken into account to spur economic growth, even in developing countries. 
Using a very large cross-country sample incorporating both developed and developing 
countries, Levine and Servos (1998) show that stock market liquidity leads to faster rate 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: Tel. +33 5 55 14 92 05 
E-mail address: laurent.augier@univ-lr.fr, wahyoe.soedarmono@unilim.fr  
 
2In empirical study, see King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine (1998); Rajan and Zingales (1998) at the 
country level study, and Fisman and Love (2002) at the industry level; or recently Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002) at the firm level. In theoretical study, see Bencivenga and Smith (1991), or recently 
Hung and Cothren (2002). Levine (2005) provide a comprehensive literature review. 
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of growth, productivity improvement, and capital accumulation3. Their paper supports 
Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al (1995), where stock market liquidity facilitates long-
term investment, since investors can easily sell their stake in the project if they need 
liquidity before their project matures. Enhanced liquidity and long-term investment, 
therefore, increase higher-return projects that boost productivity growth.  
 However, it is also well accepted that financial market tends to be more prone to 
asymmetric information problems and thus, financial liberalization fostering stock market 
liquidity is often blamed for macroeconomic downturn, as well as banking vulnerability 
and crisis (Bihde, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagriache, 1999). Thus, the adverse effect 
of financial market appears. This is why according to Diamond (1984) the presence of 
bank as financial intermediation is necessary, since banks have technology to gain 
information from investors which enhance investor’s rational decision based on their 
consumption profile. 
 Building on the previous literatures on the importance of financial intermediation 
on economic growth, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that financial intermediation is 
better than financial market (financial autarky) in order to spur economic growth. In their 
contribution, there are basic lists of bank activities such as loans funded deposits, holding 
liquid reserves against predictable withdrawal demands, issuing liabilities that are more 
liquid than their primary asset, and reducing the need of self-investment. The main result 
of their model is that financial intermediation promotes the productive long-term 
(illiquid) investment rather than short-term (liquid) ventures.  
 Surprisingly, the optimal proportion long-term investment is decreasing in the 
income of long-term investment itself, although it is increasing in the fraction of 
entrepreneurs. It is also surprising that the optimal proportion of long-term investment is 
increasing in the income of short-term ventures and the fraction of non-entrepreneurs. 
Hence, although the income of long-term investment is higher than the income of short-
term ventures, it does not always incitate agents to be entrepreneur. This implies that 
entrepreneurship is not always a growth-enhancing factor, since the opportunity cost of 
being entrepreneur are very high.  
                                                 
3 Stock market liquidity refers to the less expensive cost of equities trading.   
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 Recently, both theoretical and empirical studies have questioned the positive link 
between financial intermediation and economic growth. In the theoretical study, Deidda 
and Fattouh (2002) show a non-linear relationship between financial intermediation and 
endogenous growth. In their model, the effect of financial intermediation on economic 
growth remains ambiguous at low initial levels of the development of banking sector and 
the existence of risk-averse agents. This is because risk-averse agents always prefer to 
incur financial transaction costs even though the expected return on their savings is lower 
than under financial autarky. Such a situation occurs because financial intermediation can 
fully perform in risk diversification process. As a consequence, economic growth rate 
under banking sector is lower than under financial autarky. Conversely, the relationship 
between banking sector development and economic growth will be always positive, and 
the level of banking sector development depends on the initial level of real per capita 
income.  
 Moreover, in the empirical examination, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) also find that 
there is no significant effect of financial development on economic growth in low-income 
countries, whereas in high-income countries, there is a positive link between financial 
development and economic growth. In the cross-country study, Mihci (2006) find that the 
relationship between finance and growth does not necessarily positive when substantial 
variations across different periods and country groups are taken into account. In the 
single country study, Crouzille et al (2007) indicate the presence of threshold effect on 
the link between rural bank development and regional growth in the Philippines. 
 The aim of this paper is therefore to reevaluate the theoretical finance-growth 
nexus with the existence of threshold effect. We modify several hypothesis used by 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991). First, since our motivation is to model the most suitable 
condition for developing countries, we consider that externalities changes due to 
technological innovation may be less important, so that they may not much play a pivotal 
role in boosting economic growth. Hence, we use the Neo-classical growth without 
externalities in an overlapping generation (OLG) model with three periods instead of 
drawing endogenous growth model as developed by Bencivenga and Smith (1991), and 
Deidda and Fattouh (2002). Using the Neo-classical growth framework allows us to 
obtain more realistic growth rate in developing countries, where the growth rate in 
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consecutive years is not necessarily positive. Second, we distinguish the behaviour vis-à-
vis of risk between non-entrepreneur and entrepreneur. More precisely, the entrepreneurs 
are supposed to be risk neutral4. This hypothesis allows us to consider that entrepreneurs’ 
risk-taking behaviour may be the source of costly overinvestment which reduces long-
term economic growth5.  
 Using these features, our contributions are threefold. First, we show that 
entrepreneurship is always growth-enhancing factor in both bank-based and market-based 
financial  system, since the optimal proportion of long-term investment is increasing in 
the fraction of entrepreneurs, the income of long-term investment and short-term 
ventures, as well as the agent’s savings rate. Second, we show that agent’s saving is a 
main determinant of the optimal proportion of long-term investment, where in 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), financial intermediation is not incitated to raise agents’ 
savings as input. Therefore, we characterize the traditional role of bank as financial 
intermediation (deposits and investments). Third, our model is characterized by the 
existence of multiple steady states with the threshold effect of capital stock as 
development trap problem which impedes the economy to reach the higher long-run 
steady state equilibrium. In this case, financial intermediation is better than financial 
autarky, since threshold level under financial intermediation is lower than under financial 
autarky, and financial intermediation yields a higher transition of capital stock than 
financial autarky.  
 Our results differ from that of Deidda and Fattouh (2002) for several reasons. 
First, we use the Neoclassical growth framework, while they use endogenous growth. 
Second, we emphasize that banking sector develooment is always better than financial 
autarky to decrease threshold level and increase long-run capital stock, while in Deidda 
and Fattouh (2002) the opposite is true at low levels of the financial development. Third, 
our threshold effect is due to the initial level of capital stock, while in their model, 
threshold effect is due to the initial level of real per capita income. Since the real per 
                                                 
4 Azariadis and Smith (1998) also use this hypothesis for the different framework of model.  
5 Baumol (1990) analyzes the riskiness of entrepreneurship activity which may be unproductive or even 
destructive. This fact should not be neglected by financial sectors whose role is to provide financial 
supports for entrepreneurship activity. 
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capita income depends on the initial level of capital stock for production, their model 
may suffer from major reverse causality problems on the finance-growth nexus.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model set-
up. Section 3 models the financial market through financial market. Section 4 models the 
bank-based financial system. Section 5 builds the study of capital stock dynamic and 
threshold effect. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Set-Up 
  The framework we use is one of overlapping generations (OLG) model with three 
periods and a unique good. We suppose that there is no population growth in the 
economy and each generation consists of a continuum of agents with size 1 NNt . 
Each agent may live for two or three periods. Let t be the time index, where the young 
and middle-age generations are endowed with an initial per firm capital stock of 0k  units 
at t = 0 and 1k  units at t = 1, respectively. Moreover, each young agent supplies 
inelastically one unit of labour in the first period. 
  At the first period, all agents of a generation are identical. At the beginning of the 
second period, the agents learn whether they will be either non-entrepreneurs (two-
period-lived agents) or entrepreneurs (three-period-lived agents) with probability )1(   
and  , respectively. Thus, there are N)1(   agents who will be non-entrepreneur at the 
second period and N  agents who will be entrepreneur at the third period. All young 
agents save entirely their labour income in the first period. Meanwhile, if agents are non-
entrepreneur, they consume their second period incomes, tc1 . If the agent is entrepreneur, 
he consumes the profit of production in the third period, tc2 .  Thus, agents have different 
liquidity needs, where the non-entrepreneurs have higher liquidity need than 
entrepreneurs, since because non-entrepreneurs only live for two periods. Meanwhile, the 
young agents have incentive to be entrepreneur because the profit of long-term 
investment is relatively higher than the return of non-entrepreneur’s saving. We assume 
that entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. Finally, whatever the type of agents, we can define the 
agent’s preferences by the following expected utility function. 
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   tttt ccccU 2121
)1(),( 

  

  ,   where 00 tc          (1) 
We define itc  as the period i consumption of an agent who is born at t. The constant 
relative risk aversion is denoted by 1 . The variable   stands for the individual 
specific random variable realized at the beginning of period 2. Thus, the value of    is 
equal to 0 with probability 1 , or 1 with probability .  
 In order to complete this model, we characterize the production function and the 
entrepreneur’s behaviour. The entrepreneur’s production ty  is realized by physical capital 
tk  and units of labour tL . We follow the Cobb-Douglas production function as follows 
  1ttt LAky                (2) 
where  1,0  is the part of production that uses tk  and A is an arbitrary coefficient. For 
simplification, we assume that capital depreciates completely at the end of period. 
Furthermore, there is no endowment of capital at period 0t  except for the initial old 
generation and middle-age generation. In order to complete the entrepreneur program, the 
profit function must be established. The entrepreneur’s profit t  is the difference 
between the production and the cost of quantity units of labour defined 
ttttttt LwLAkLk 
 1),( . At the equilibrium of labour market, labour demand tL  is 
equal to labour supply, NN t  , which is obtained by maximizing the entrepreneur’s 
profit subject to tL . Thus, we have 
 tt kAw )1(   and the maximized profit function 
at each period t as much as  
  tt kA , with 
11     tL               (3) 
 
3. Financial Market 
  This system refers to an economy without the presence of bank as financial 
intermediation. In the first period, the agents divide their savings ts  between liquid and 
illiquid assets. Liquid assets are considered as inventory of consumption goods. One unit 
invested in liquid asset at t directly yields 0n  units of consumption goods at both 1t  
and 2t . On the other hand, one unit invested in the illiquid asset yields R units of 
 7  
capital goods at t+2. If illiquid asset is liquidated at t+1, then the agents receive the 
“scrap value” of x units of consumption goods, where nx 0 .  
  In order to establish the agents’ budget constraint, we define mtz  and 
m
tq  as the 
proportion of liquid asset and illiquid asset invested at t, respectively. The superscript m 
stands for the financial market. Hence, we have 
  1 mt
m
t qz , where 0,0 
m
t
m
t qz              (4) 
At the first period, the agents’ saving is equal to labour income, tt ws  , and is divided 
into t
m
t sz  units of liquid asset and t
m
t sq  units of illiquid asset. Let SILL iii ,, be the interest 
rate of the liquid asset, illiquid asset, and “scrap” value, respectively. At the second 
period, let t1  be the income of non-entrepreneur after one period, then  
   t
m
t
m
tt wxqzn )(1   , where Lin  1  and )1( six             (5) 
By the hypothesis, if the agents are entrepreneur, then their consumption at the second 
period is equal to zero. At the beginning of the third period, the entrepreneur sells his 
illiquid assets and reinvests them in the physical capital, so that mtt
m
tIL ksqi 2)1(  . This 
situation corresponds to the financial autarky case. At the third period, let t2  be the 
income received by entrepreneur before the production, then  
t
m
tt
m
tt wqRwzn 2 , where ILiR 1 , and 
m
tt
m
t kwqR 2       (6.a) 
and Rnx 0                   (6.b) 
Using the profit function (3) and the budget constraints in the equation (4), (5) and (6.a), 
we now define the agent’s expected utility function when investment is self-financed.   
 tmttmttmttmtmt nwqwRqAwqnwxqqU )1()()1(()1()( 


 





        (7) 
Meanwhile, the agents’ optimization program is defined as  )(maxarg
00
m
t
q
qU
m
t 
. 
 From the first order condition, we obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset 
( mtq ) as follows. 
  
  
 xnw
wB
xn
nwqq
t
t
t
m
t
m
t 



 1
1
)(             (8) 
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where     







xnw
wARnwwB
t
tt
t


  2
1
      
 The optimal proportion of illiquid investment mtq  depends on the labour 
income tw
6. Moreover, the existence of mtq  in which 10 
m
tq  can be examined by the 
limit value of mtq  when 
 0tw  and 
tw . From (8), it is straightforward to obtain  


m
t
w
q
t 0
lim  and 1lim 

m
t
w
q
t
, if tt nwwAR 
 2  . Hence, there is a value of 
tw which implies that 0
m
tq .  
 
4. Financial Intermediation 
  We assume that agent’s financial decisions are intermediated through the banking 
system. Therefore, we can directly define the program of financial intermediaries realized 
by an institution called as “bank”. We assume that bank is a coalition of young agents 
who can be either non-entrepreneur or entrepreneur.  Let tz  and 
b
tq  be the proportion of 
liquid and illiquid investment realized by banks, respectively. Thus, we have 
 1 bt
b
t qz               (9) 
Banks ensure non-entrepreneur to receive btR1  units of consumption goods at t+1 from 
each unit invested at t as following7  
 xqnzR bt
b
tt
b
t 211)1(               (10) 
where t1  and t2  are the part of liquid and illiquid asset liquidated at the second period, 
respectively. The bank chooses the values of t1  and t2 . Moreover, banks also ensure 
entrepreneurs to receive btR2  units of capital goods at t+2 from each unit of time t illiquid 
investment and btR2
~  units of time t+1 consumption goods from each unit liquid asset 
invested at t. For the withdrawal after two periods, there are  entrepreneurs who must 
receive btR2  units of capital goods from each unit of illiquid investment. Thus, 
b
tR2  factor 
                                                 
6 In Bencivenga and Smith (1991), this optimal proportion of illiquid investment is constant.  
7 The index b refers the banking interest factor bR , where  bR1 .  
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must be equal to the rest of illiquid asset )1( 2t  multiplied by the income of 
investment btqR . Thus, the bank must provide capital goods for entrepreneurs as much as 
b
tt
b
t qRR )1( 22                (11) 
In addition, entrepreneurs must also receive btR2
~  units of consumption goods for each unit 
of liquid investment at t. The constraint btR2
~  must be equal to the rest of consumption 
goods ( t11  ) multiplied by nz
b
t . Thus, banks must provide consumption goods for 
entrepreneurs as much as 
 nzR btt
b
t )1(
~
12                (12) 
In the next step, we define the program of financial intermediation for two types of agent. 
Firstly, there are )1(  non-entrepreneurs who will liquidate their investment at t+1. 
Thus, the bank must ensure the non-entrepreneur by holding t
b
t wR1  units of consumption 
goods to be distributed at t+1. Secondly, there are also   entrepreneurs who will 
liquidate their investment at the beginning of t+2. Thus, the bank must ensure 
entrepreneurs by holding t
b
t wR2  units of capital goods and t
b
t wR2
~  units of consumption 
goods to be distributed at t+2. Using budget constraints in the equation (10), (11), and 
(12) we define the program of financial intermediation in the following relation 
 )~)(()()1(),( 22121 t
b
tt
b
tt
b
ttt wRwRAwRccU 
   

              (13) 
Note that in the third period (t+2), entrepreneurs will use their income of investment to 
finance physical capital and use it in the production. Hence, we have btt
b
t kwR 22  . In 
order to simplify condition in the equation (13), we assume that the bank should provide 
the liquidity at t+1, since none of the capital assets is liquidated “prematurely”. Thus, the 
bank should fulfil the following liquidity constraint 
 nRA                (14) 
By this assumption, we can reduce some variables as follows. In the third period (t+2), 
the bank will only consider the existence of  entrepreneur. From (11), we have 

t
b
tb
t
wqR
k 2  as individual capital.  Since the entrepreneur runs the production to get 
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the profit, then their profit should be superior to all income of liquid investment. Such 
condition provides incentive for agents to become entrepreneur. In other words, 
nRA  , and  
      tbttbtt wqnwqRA  //)1( 2          (15.a) 
Equation (15.a) is fulfilled if and only if the bank set 
 02 t            (15.b) 
Meanwhile, the bank also maximizes the expected utility of non-entrepreneur. It means 
that the bank will reallocate the non-entrepreneur’s illiquid assets into liquid assets at the 
beginning of t+1. For realizing this strategy, the bank will therefore set 
 11 t             (15.c) 
Using (15.b) and (15.c), we simplify (10), (11) and (12) respectively become  
n
z
R
b
tb
t 

11
              (16) 
b
t
b
t q
RR

2               (17) 
0~2 
b
tR               (18) 
Using (16), (17), and (18), and the budget constraint (9) we establish the program of 
financial intermediaries as follows  
 

















 



 t
b
t
t
b
tb
t
wRq
Anw
q
qU
1
1)1()(                    (19) 
Hence, banks will choose btq  to maximize )(
b
tqU . From the first-order condition, we 
obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( btq ) as follows 
 
 
t
t
b
t
b
t nw
B
wqq
 

1
1
1)1(1)(            (20) 
where 
t
t
nw
wRA
B


 

2
1





 .  
 
5. Capital Stock Accumulation and Threshold Effect 
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  In comparing the level of steady state equilibrium of capital stock under financial 
market and banking, we establish Proposition 1 and 2 as follows.  
 
Proposition 1 
From (8) and (20), we denote that the optimal value of illiquid investment under financial 
intermediation is higher than the optimal value of illiquid investment under financial 
market.  In other words, we prove that mt
b
t qq     
Proof:  
For 0x , we then show that     tt nwBnwB    1
1
1
1
1)1( . Thus, we examine 
whether BB 1 . From 1B  and B , we only examine if 













 





1
1
2)1( tw
RA
 

 




 

1
1
2 )(
1 tt
nwwAR         
Let 




















1
1
2
1 tw
RAD and
 

 




 


1
1
2
2 )(1 tt
nwwARD , then we 
simplify 21)1( DD  . Since ]1,0[, 
m
t
b
t qq , then     1maxmax 21  DD . Thus, the 
inequality 21)1( DD   is proved because 1)1(0   . Finally, Proposition 1 is 
proved. 
 
Proposition 2 
The existence of banks in an economy enhances economic growth more significantly than 
the absence of banks. 
Proof:   
In the case of financial intermediation based on banking sector, economic growth is 
determined by the value of 

t
b
tb
t
wqR
k 2 . Meanwhile, in the case of financial market, 
economic growth is determined by the value of of t
m
t
m
t wqRk 2 . From Proposition 1, it 
is straightforward to find mt
b
t   , where 
t
b
tb
t k
k 2  and 
t
m
tm
t k
k 2  are the change of 
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tk
2tk
**m
tk
market
bank
*b
tk
*m
tk
**b
tk
12 
t
b
t
kd
kd
12 
t
m
t
kd
kd
0k
capital stock in the economy based on banking sector and financial market, respectively.  
Proposition 2 is thus proved.  
 In order to illustrate the dynamics of capital accumulation, we run a numerical 
example and the graphic is shown as follows8.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Capital Accumulation  
 
In Figure 1, we denote that there are threshold effects at *btk  and 
*m
tk  for the bank-based 
economy and the financial market-based economy, respectively. The following 
proposition shows that the existence of financial intermediaries is important to reduce the 
threshold effect and increase long-run steady state equilibrium of capital accumulation.    
 
Proposition 3 
There is always a threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus, so that financial 
development cannot support economic growth, unless its initial level exceeds the 
threshold effect. However, threshold effect in the economy based on banking sector is 
lower than the one based on financial market. It suggests that the bank-based financial 
system is less costly than financial market based-system to ensure the existence and 
uniqueness of long-run steady state equilibrium of capital accumulation and hence, boost 
economic growth. 
                                                 
8 Numerical examples are available on request. 
tt kk 2
 13  
 
 
Proof: 
 To prove Proposition 3, we firstly show that threshold effect exists in both the 
bank-based and financial market-based economy. Then, we compare both of them. 
 
(i) The economy based on banking sector 
 From (20) and the stylized fact that 

t
b
tb
t
wqR
k 2 , we denote that the functional 
form of )(2 t
b
t kfk   is difficult to be identified. And we cannot solve tk  algebraically 
from the equation tt
b
t kkfk  )(2  to find the roots 
*b
tk  and 
**m
tk . Hence, we should 
derive 

t
b
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t
wqR
k 2 in order to obtain its first-order condition as follows 
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where 

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The threshold effect *btk  exists, if and only if there is tk that implies 12 
t
b
t
kd
kd . In other 
words, 012 
t
b
t
kd
kd
 and at this point, the curve 

t
b
tb
t
wqR
k 2  cuts t
b
t kk 2  as shown 
at Figure 1. In order to simplify the functional form of the first-order condition, we 
examine the special case of model. Suppose that 1  and as a consequence, 1 . 
Under this condition, we simply obtain  
 
t
tt
t
b
t
k
RkAk
kd
kd 

)1(
1lim 2
1



        (22) 
Note that in this proof, despite assuming that 1 , we do not change the purpose of the 
model. As long as our purpose is to model the role of financial intermediation in boosting 
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long-term investment and entrepreneurship, the absence of non-entrepreneurs does not 
affect the change of capital stock. It is because economic growth should not be depended 
on non-entrepreneurs but entrepreneurs. Through (22), we should find tk  in order to 
make its right-hand side becomes positive. In other words, 
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Since 0, RA  and 10  , then .0
)1(
1 1
1






RA
 Hence, we obtain 
 
1
1
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
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

RA
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Equation (24) is simply defined as the threshold level of bank-based financial system, 
since for every tk and 
*b
tt kk  , we always find the function 1
2 
t
b
t
kd
kd . The 
existence of threshold effect in the bank-based financial system is therefore confirmed. 
  
 (ii) The economy based on financial market 
 To prove the existence of threshold effect under financial market, we use the same 
characterization of the bank-based economy. Suppose that 1  and consequently, 
1 . It means that financial market exists only for responding the entrepreneur’s 
needs. Solving the first-order condition for t
m
tt
m
t wqRkfk  )(2  and its limit for 1 , 
we obtain 
 1
)1(
1lim
1
2
1






 xn
RnkA
kd
kd t
t
m
t 
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The threshold effect *mtk  exists, if and only if there is 0tk that implies 12 
t
m
t
kd
kd  or 
012 
t
m
t
kd
kd  . By solving tk in (25), we obtain  
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By the fact that 10  , then it is straightforward to denote that 0* mtk . Hence, the 
existence of threshold effect in the economy based on financial market is proved.  
 
(iii). Bank vs. Financial Market 
 To prove that threshold effect in the bank-based economy is lower than in the 
economy based on financial market, we should show that  
 


)1(
1)1(


 RAxn
AnR              (27) 
By substituting 1  into (27), it simply shows that the left-hand side tends to 0, but the 
right-hand side tends to infinity. Instead, if we substitute 0 , then we denote the left-
hand side tends to 0, and the right-hand side tends to 1. By these results, Proposition 3 is 
finally proved. Differently phrased, threshold effect in the bank-based economy system is 
lower than in the economy based on financial market.  
 Why threshold effect is so important in the finance-growth nexus? Suppose that 
0k  is the initial capital of an economy that lies below the threshold level of market-
financed system *mtk  (see Figure 1). In order to reach the long-run steady state capital, 0k  
should be iterated by financial intermediation (see bank curve at Figure 1). Such situation 
may drive the economy to converge to **2
bk . Conversely, if 0k  is only iterated by the 
financial market curve (see market curve at Figure 1), the economy will disappear 
because the steady state capital stock tends to zero. Hence, we find that the bank-based 
economy is better than the economy based on financial market in order to ensure the 
existence and uniqueness of long-run steady state capital stock, and to reduce threshold 
effect. In turn, long-run economic growth can be boosted due to an increase in long-term 
productive investments and a decline in short-term ventures. By extension, the potential 
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source of speculations from short-term ventures is therefore reduced. However, since 
*
0
b
tkk   as shown in Figure 2, the capital accumulation will also converge to zero even if 
there is financial intermediation in the economy. In such a case, there is no positive link 
between financial development and economic growth.   
   
6. Conclusion 
In providing further issue on the finance-growth nexus, we have reevaluated the 
model of financial intermediation à la Bencivenga and Smith (1991). Our originality is 
twofold. First, in modelling the finance-growth nexus, we use the Neo-classical growth 
framework instead of drawing endogenous growth as developed by Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991). Second, we distinguish the behaviour vis-à-vis of risk between non-
entrepreneur and entrepreneur.  
Using these features, we find that the bank-based economy is better than the 
economy based on financial market in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of 
long-run steady state equilibrium of capital accumulation, which is a necessary condition 
to achieve long-run economic growth. Moreover, we found that any level of financial 
development (either through banking or financial market) has a threshold effect. But the 
presence of banks as financial intermediaries clearly reduces the threshold level. The 
presence of threshold effect is a new finding in the finance-growth nexus, since it 
captures the difficulty of raising initial capital stock and reaching long-run economic 
growth. Thus, threshold effect should be acknowledged in future empirical research on 
the finance-growth nexus, notably in developing countries, where externalities due to 
human capital and technological innovations are not yet well-developed.  
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